of old warrants or subpoenas. Judicial acts do not have eternal life as a commodity, and
sometimes between the beginning of the 18th century and the end of the 19th century,
rights holders or perhaps archivists get rid of them.60 Litigation may be the key to why
so many early modern citizens sought notary services, not only because notaries
occupied civil court portals but because notary deeds stood better than any other writing
in court. If a customer has a fear that a particular property transaction might be up for
grabs, he or she is willing to pay an additional fee for the notary to make and keep the
contract. The close relationship between legal disputes and notary records is essential to
understanding the existence of these documents (Yenny Febrianty & MHum, 2023).
In the context of sharing, this two-sided structure has important ramifications. First, a
two-sided platform can yield useful information whose value cannot be captured by the
platform itself.88 For example, trading prices on a stock exchange offer valuable
information to the public—whether they are members of the exchange or not. Similarly,
in the sharing economy: Airbnb rental prices are useful information for anyone who
wants to rent out their flat, regardless of whether they're an Airbnb customer. The result
is a classic public good: non-rival, non-excludable information, which makes resource
exploitation easier for customers and non-customers alike. In addition, for users, a two-
sided sharing platform can generate a large surplus of producers and consumers, as it
allows existing assets to be traded in new ways. Many people already own cars, parking
lots, power tools, or homes, and use sharing services to reduce the cost of those
ownership. While a marginal seller may be a professional, investing in a specialty item
to rent it on a sharing platform, there is a large population of infra-marginal sellers who
gain a huge producer surplus when sharing firms enter the market. In addition, there
are some easy substitutes for some of the services made possible by the sharing economy,
such as hourly car rentals or daily children's toy rentals. This means new sharing
companies make high-demand consumers much better overall, a huge increase in
consumer surplus. Despite the surplus effect, two-sided platforms have the
characteristics of complex economies of scale. Sharing companies are no exception: on
the one hand, there are intuitive economies of scale due to the high fixed costs of
developing a sharing platform compared to the minimal cost of adding members. This
is doubly true because each new "buyer" makes the market more valuable to the "seller",
and vice versa.
However, two-sided markets also risk creating diseconomies of scale because, the more
members who join, the harder it is for participants to identify high-value matches. In a
city with thousands of options available on Airbnb, finding one that fits a particular need
becomes more difficult. Therefore, the optimal size of the sharing platform may be
difficult to determine (Novitasari, Pebrina, Sutardi, Nugroho, & Putra, 2022).
Following a basic data collection process from table and field research (consisting of 24
interviews with officials from 10 different local governments in Turkey, South Korea,
and Brazil, NGOs, international organizations, and city networks, as well as participant